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OPINION OF THE COURT
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FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Illinois National Insurance Company
(“Illinois National”) and Appellees Wyndham Worldwide
Operations, Inc., Wyndham Worldwide Corporation,
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Wyndham Vacation Ownership Inc., and Wyndham Resort
Development Corporation (collectively “Wyndham”) are in a
contract dispute over insurance coverage. In resolving this
dispute, we must decide whether the doctrine of mutual
mistake allows reformation of a contract against a party that
did not participate in the negotiations.
Illinois National filed suit seeking a declaratory
judgment that a 2008 plane crash did not trigger coverage
under an aircraft fleet insurance policy that it issued to Jet
Aviation Business Jets, Inc. (“Jet Aviation”). Wyndham filed
a counterclaim seeking coverage and filed motions for
summary judgment and to dismiss Illinois National‟s
complaint. The United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey granted Wyndham‟s motion to dismiss Illinois
National‟s complaint as well as Wyndham‟s motion for
summary judgment on its counterclaim. On appeal, Illinois
National argues that the District Court erred both when it
determined that mutual mistake can only serve as a basis for
reformation in an action against a bargaining party and when
it held that Illinois National had insufficiently pled mutual
mistake. We agree and hold that New Jersey law allows
reformation on the basis of mutual mistake against a party
that did not participate in the negotiation of a contract and
that Illinois National sufficiently pled mutual mistake.
For the following reasons, we conclude that the
District Court‟s grant to Wyndham of summary judgment was
improper, as was its dismissal of Illinois National‟s
complaint. Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court‟s
grant of summary judgment and dismissal and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
3

I.
A.
Illinois National issues insurance products and
services.
Jet Aviation offers aircraft maintenance,
completions and refurbishment, engineering, and fixed base
operations, along with aircraft management, charter services,
aircraft sales and personnel services.
Wyndham is a
recognized service leader in the hospitality industry.
Illinois National provided insurance coverage to Jet
Aviation and to some of Jet Aviation‟s clients, so long as Jet
Aviation managed the client‟s aircraft and aircraft usage. Jet
Aviation managed an aircraft owned by Wyndham and
provided insurance for that aircraft pursuant to the terms of a
series of Aircraft Management Services Agreements.
In 2001, Wyndham‟s predecessor, Cendant
Operations, Inc., and Jet Aviation entered into the first of
these Aircraft Management Services Agreements. Among
other things, the agreements obligated Jet Aviation to provide
domestic flight planning and scheduling, flight crew staffing,
and management of scheduled and unscheduled maintenance
for Wyndham‟s aircraft. If Wyndham‟s aircraft was not
available when needed, Jet Aviation could arrange for an
aircraft for Wyndham‟s use from another source. Pursuant to
the Aircraft Management Services Agreements, Jet Aviation
agreed to procure insurance for Wyndham‟s aircraft while it
was managed by Jet Aviation. The agreement also stated that
it would provide Wyndham with insurance coverage when
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Wyndham used non-owned aircraft at the direction of Jet
Aviation.
For successive one-year periods beginning in 2004,
and through the 2008 policy year, a series of aircraft fleet
management insurance policies were purchased by Jet
Aviation and issued by Illinois National.
Each was
negotiated by Illinois National and Jet Aviation, directly and
through their agents. The policies contained endorsements
that provided coverage for Jet Aviation‟s clients. These
clients were identified on the endorsements as “Insured
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Owners” and also as “Named Insured.”1 The 2004-2007
Policies contain the following Managed Aircraft
Endorsement:

1

The Managed Aircraft Endorsement from 2004-2008

stated:
1)

Jet Aviation Business Jets, Inc.
has entered into an Aircraft
Management Agreement with the
person(s)
or
organization(s)
described below and referred to as
“Insured Owner”:

Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., Wyndham
Worldwide Corporation & Bank of America, N.A., as
Lessor
7 Sylvan Way
Parsippany, NJ 07504
And/or subsidiary (and/or subsidiary
thereof).
2)

The definition of Named Insured is
extended to include the person(s) or
organization(s) described in Item 1 of
this endorsement.
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4)

The insurance afforded by this policy for
the interest of the “Insured Owner”
described in Item 1. of this endorsement
shall not be invalidated by any act or
neglect of Jet Aviation Business Jets,
Inc. listed in Item 1 of the policy
Declarations provided that the “Insured
Owner” described in Item 1. of this
endorsement did not consent to such act
or neglect which would otherwise
invalidate the insurance provided by this
policy or that the “Insured Owner”
described in Item 1. of this endorsement
had no knowledge that such act or
neglect to which they consented would
invalidate the insurance provided by this
policy.
The insurance afforded by this policy for
the interest of the Jet Aviation Business
Jets, Inc. listed in Item 1 of the policy
Declarations shall not be invalidated by
any act or neglect of the “Insured
Owner” described in Item 1. of this
endorsement provided that the Named
Insured listed in Item 1. of the policy
Declarations did not consent to such act

(App. at A471 (2004 Policy, with Cendant listed because
Wyndham had not yet been spun off); (Id. at A1235 (2008
Policy).).)
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or neglect which would otherwise
invalidate the insurance provided by this
policy.
5)

The insurance afforded by this policy for
the interest of the “Insured Owner”
described in Item 1 of this endorsement
or Jet Aviation Business Jets, Inc. (as
fully described in Item 1 of the
Declarations Page) is extended to other
Aircraft insured under this policy but
excluding any Non-Owned Aircraft
unless such Non-Owned Aircraft is
operated by or used at the direction of Jet
Aviation Business Jets, Inc. . . .

(App at. A471.)
In the negotiations leading up to the 2008 policy, Jet
Aviation proposed new language for the endorsement. The
revised endorsement, which was integrated into the 2008
policy, replaced “Jet Aviation” with “Named Insured.” It
provided:
4)

The insurance afforded by this policy for
the interest of the “Insured Owner”
described in Item 1. of this endorsement
shall not be invalidated by any act or
neglect of the Named Insured listed in
Item 1 of the policy Declarations
provided that the “Insured Owner”
described in Item 1. of this endorsement
8

did not consent to such act or neglect
which would otherwise invalidate the
insurance provided by this policy or that
the “Insured Owner” described in Item 1.
of this endorsement had no knowledge
that such act or neglect to which they
consented would invalidate the insurance
provided by this policy.
The insurance afforded by this policy for
the interest of the Named Insured listed
in Item 1 of the policy Declarations shall
not be invalidated by any act or neglect
of the “Insured Owner” described in Item
1. of this endorsement provided that the
Named Insured listed in Item 1. of the
policy Declarations did not consent to
such act or neglect which would
otherwise invalidate the insurance
provided by this policy.
5)

The insurance afforded by this policy for
the interest of the “Insured Owner”
described in Item 1. of this endorsement
or Named Insured (as fully described in
Item 1 of the Declarations Page) is
extended to other Aircraft insured under
this policy but excluding any NonOwned Aircraft unless such Non-Owned
Aircraft is operated by or used at the
direction of the Named Insured. . . .
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(Id. at A1235.)
Jet Aviation and Illinois National claim that the
drafting change was designed to make it more clear that
entities affiliated with Jet Aviation were covered. Both
contracting parties have stated that they believed that it did
not expand coverage to entities that were unaffiliated with Jet
Aviation, such as Wyndham. However, the modification, as
written, appears to provide third parties with coverage when
using non-owned aircraft without Jet Aviation‟s involvement.
Despite being drafted to seemingly provide expanded
coverage, Wyndham‟s premium declined from $61,250 for
the 2007 policy to $45,367 for the 2008 policy. Wyndham
did not know about the change made to the endorsement for
2008 and continued to obtain non-owned aircraft liability
coverage through a policy issued by StarNet Insurance
Company (“StarNet”).2
It is undisputed that neither Wyndham nor its brokers
was involved in the negotiations or drafting of the revised
provisions of the endorsement. It was negotiated between
Illinois National and Jet Aviation.
In August 2008, Jason Ketcheson, a Wyndham
employee, rented a Cessna 172 from Aviation Adventures to
travel to a work-related meeting in Oregon. Jet Aviation had
2

The StarNet policy provided coverage for non-owned
aircraft that were not operated by or used at the direction of
Jet Aviation. In other words, it explicitly provides coverage
for incidents like the 2008 plane crash.
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no involvement in this transaction. Ketcheson crashed into a
house in Gearhart, Oregon, killing five people. As a result,
various claimants have sued Wyndham for damages. The
crash may have triggered coverage under the language of the
2008 policy.
B.
Illinois National filed suit against Wyndham seeking a
declaratory judgment that the 2008 policy did not cover
claims arising out of the August 2008 Cessna crash. It argued
that the District Court should find that the 2008 policy, as
written, did not provide coverage to Wyndham, or
alternatively, that if the contract as written would provide
coverage, the District Court should exercise its equitable
power of reformation because there had been mutual mistake
in the drafting of the contract between Illinois National and
Jet Aviation.
Wyndham filed a counterclaim seeking
coverage under the 2008 policy for the August 2008 Cessna
crash, filing a motion to dismiss Illinois National‟s claim and
a motion for summary judgment. Both sides filed statements
of material facts not in dispute; additionally, Illinois National
filed a supplemental statement of disputed material facts and
requested more discovery.
The District Court granted both of Wyndham‟s
motions, holding that Wyndham was entitled to coverage
under the 2008 policy and that Illinois National was not
entitled to reformation based upon the alleged mistake. The
District Court held that the 2008 policy was clear on its face
and that Wyndham was entitled to coverage as a matter of
law. The District Court went on to explain that “because
11

Wyndham did not participate in the negotiation and drafting
of the 2008 policy, there can be no mutual mistake.” Illinois
Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., No.
09-1724, 2010 WL 3326709 at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2010).
Instead, the District Court analyzed Illinois National‟s
argument in the context of unilateral mistake and determined
that reformation was unavailable. Id. at *5-6. Further, the
District Court dismissed Illinois National‟s complaint on the
basis that it failed to plead mistake with particularity as
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Id.
Illinois National filed a timely notice of appeal.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a) because the parties‟ citizenship was completely
diverse and the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. We
have jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review of the District Court‟s order. See McGovern
v. Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009) (plenary
review of order granting motion to dismiss); Spence v. Esab
Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010) (plenary
review of order granting summary judgment motion).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
--- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A party is entitled to summary judgment
when it demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the evidence establishes its entitlement
12

to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In reviewing a
motion for summary judgment, “we must view the facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all
inferences in that party's favor.” Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Basell
USA Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
III.
Illinois National argues that the District Court erred in
granting summary judgment to Wyndham on its counter
claim by erroneously interpreting New Jersey law and
concluding that reformation on the basis of mutual mistake
can never be sought against a third-party that was not present
when the contract was consummated. Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co.,
2010 WL 3326709 at *5. Illinois National argues that there is
no categorical rule preventing a contracting party from
seeking reformation for mutual mistake when the party
against whom reformation is being sought did not participate
in the negotiation of the contract at issue.
When interpreting state law, we follow a state‟s
highest court; if that state‟s highest court has not provided
guidance, we are charged with predicting how that court
would resolve the issue. Canal Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at
Lloyd's London, 435 F.3d 431, 436 (3d Cir. 2006). To do so,
we must take into consideration: (1) what that court has said
in related areas; (2) the decisional law of the state
intermediate courts; (3) federal cases interpreting state law;
and (4) decisions from other jurisdictions that have discussed
the issue. Id. (citing Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d
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661, 675 (3d Cir. 2002).). “Although lower state court
decisions are not controlling on an issue on which the highest
court of the state has not spoken, federal courts must attribute
significant weight to these decisions in the absence of any
indication that the highest state court would rule otherwise.”
Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 273-74
(3d Cir. 1985).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has set out general
principles for contract interpretation and reformation:
As a general rule, courts should enforce
contracts as the parties intended. Similarly, it is
a basic rule of contractual interpretation that a
court must discern and implement the common
intention of the parties. The court‟s role is to
consider what is written in the context of the
circumstances at the time of drafting and to
apply a rational meaning in keeping with the
expressed general purpose.
Pacifico v. Pacifico, 920 A.2d 73, 77 (N.J. 2007) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). In furtherance of the
goal of binding parties to their mutual intent at the time of
contracting, a court may reform a contract if it “was created
by the negotiations of the parties, but by mutual mistake is
wanting in formal expression or execution, so as to evince the
actual intent of the parties. Gross v. Yeskel, 134 A.2d 737,
737 (N.J. Eq. 1926) (internal citations omitted).
“Generally, when interpreting an insurance policy,
courts should give the policy‟s words their plain, ordinary
14

meaning.” Nav-Its, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 869 A.2d
929, 933 (N.J. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). We interpret a contract according to its plain
language by reading the document as a whole in a fair and
common sense manner so as to match the reasonable
expectations of the parties. Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. AbdulMatin, 965 A.2d 1165, 1168-69 (N.J. 2009).
However, in New Jersey, even an unambiguous
contract may be reformed when there was mutual mistake and
the written contract does not match what the parties intended.
Cent. State Bank v. Hudik-Ross Co., Inc., 396 A.2d 347, 350
(N.J. Super. 1978) (“The rule that contracts may be reformed
where there has been mutual mistake is „well settled in our
jurisprudence.‟”). A mutual mistake is “1. A mistake in
which each party misunderstands the other's intent. . . . [or]
2. A mistake that is shared and relied on by both parties to a
contract.” Black's Law Dictionary 1023 (8th ed. 2004).
Mutual mistake is evaluated by determining the
understanding of the parties at the time the contract was
formed. Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, 560 A.2d 655, 65960 (N.J. 1989). A party seeking reformation for mutual
mistake must show that both parties labored under the same
misapprehension as to a particular and essential fact. Id. at
660. The understanding of persons who were not contracting
parties at the time of consummation of a contract is irrelevant.
Gross, 134 A.2d at 737 (stating that courts should only look
at the intent of the contracting parties at the time of
consummation of a contract); Sav. Inv. & Trust Co. v. Conn.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 85 A.2d 311, 314 (N.J. Super. 1952)
(“Equity, in an effort to effectuate the intent of contracting
15

parties, will exercise its power to reform instruments where
there has been a mutual mistake of the parties.”).
“The power of a court of equity to reform deeds and
other writings for the correction of mistakes stands among its
most ancient and useful powers.” Cummins v. Bulgin, 37 N.J.
Eq. 476, 476 (1883). That power is not limited to the original
parties to the contract, but extends to all those standing in
privity with them. Union Fur Shop. v. Max Melzer, Inc., 29
A.2d 873, 876 (N.J. 1943) (subsequent purchaser of business
entitled to reformation of contract between original seller and
buyer, based upon evidence of original seller‟s and buyer‟s
common intention); see also Allen B. Du Mont Lab., Inc. v.
Marcalus Mfg. Co., 152 A.2d 841, 846 (N.J. 1959) (rejecting
argument that reformation is impossible in the absence of an
original party to the transaction: “If reformation is sought to
establish a right against another, then of course that other
must be before the court; a party to the mistake need not be
joined unless he has a subsisting interest that will be
affected.”).
The District Court held that “because Wyndham did
not participate in the negotiation and drafting of the 2008
policy, there can be no mutual mistake.” Illinois Nat’l Ins.
Co., 2010 WL 3326709 at *5. Id. We believe this is an
errant interpretation of New Jersey law. Reformation on the
basis of mutual mistake can be granted even when it is to the
disadvantage of a third party.
Turning to the facts, Illinois National and Jet Aviation
were the only parties that negotiated and drafted the 2008
policy. (App. at A397-98.) As Wyndham admits, it “had
16

[no] involvement with . . . [the] revision to the Endorsement.
[The contracting parties] never communicated with
Wyndham to discuss the revision or request input. . . . [And,]
Wyndham never had an opportunity to form an understanding
of what [the contracting parties] intended when [they]
inserted „Named Insured.‟” (Br. for Appellee Wyndham at
7.) Jet Aviation and Illinois National agree that their intent, at
the time the contract was drafted, was to limit coverage for
non-owned aircraft to aircraft used by or at the direction of Jet
Aviation. (App. at A1773.)
Under these circumstances, the District Court erred by
not analyzing the contract under the principles of mutual
mistake set forth under New Jersey law. On remand, the
District Court should evaluate Illinois National‟s and Jet
Aviation‟s intent as well as Wyndham‟s arguments that
reformation may be inequitable due to negligence and
because the remedy is sought after an accident.
IV.
Illinois National argues that the District Court also
erred by determining that Illinois National‟s complaint
seeking declaratory judgment should be dismissed under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 9(b). The District Court stated that Illinois
National had failed to “identify with the required particularity
„the who, what, when, where, and how‟ of the mistake as
required by Rule 9(b).” Illinois National, 2010 WL 3326709
at *12. Rule 9(b) provides that when a party alleges fraud or
mistake, “a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Id. Rule 9(b)
exists to insure adequate notice so that defendants can
17

intelligently respond. Morganroth & Morganroth v. Norris,
McLaughlin & Marcus, P.C., 331 F.3d 406, 414 n.2 (3d Cir.
2003) (“The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to provide notice, not to
test the factual allegations of the claim.”).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege
facts sufficient to nudge his claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible. Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515
F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).). Illinois National‟s
complaint stated that it sought a declaratory judgment that the
2008 policy did not cover the August 2008 Cessna incident.
(App. at A40.) The complaint stated the understanding of the
parties, Illinois National and Jet Aviation, at the time of
drafting: “[d]uring the negotiations for each of the Policies,
the parties understood and agreed that liability coverage
available to Insured Owners for the use of non-owned aircraft
was limited to non-owned aircraft operated by or used at the
direction of Jet Aviation Business Jets, Inc.” (Id. at A41.)
Further, it identified the specific drafting error that had been
made. (Id. at A45.) Specifically, the 2008 policy substituted
“Jet Aviation Business Jets, Inc.” with “Named Insured”
without realizing that doing so could lead to the contract
being read to provide coverage to Insured Owners for nonowned aircraft that were not operated by or used at the
direction of Jet Aviation Business Jets, Inc. (Id.)
The complaint was sufficient. It specifically alleged
the mistake and the remedy being sought. (Id. at A43-6.)
Wyndham‟s counterclaim shows that it understood what was
being pleaded. (Id. at A52-64.) Illinois National‟s complaint
met the purpose of Rule 9(b) in that Wyndham was able to
18

answer, engage in discovery, and move for summary
judgment on its counterclaim.
The District Court therefore erred in granting
Wyndham‟s motion to dismiss Illinois National‟s complaint
pursuant to Rule 9(b).
V.
We conclude that the District Court‟s grant of
Wyndham‟s motion for summary judgment and motion to
dismiss Illinois National‟s complaint were in error.
Accordingly, we will reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.3

3

Illinois National also contends that the District Court
erred in its interpretation of the Managed Aircraft
Endorsement and in its refusal to allow Illinois National
additional discovery pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (now
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)) prior to its grant of Wyndham‟s motion
for summary judgment. Because we dispose of this case on
the grounds that Illinois National‟s complaint was sufficient
and that the District Court applied the incorrect test for
mutual mistake, we do not reach the Illinois National‟s other
arguments for reversal.
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Nygaard, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
The majority’s exclusive focus upon mutual mistake,
and the intent of Illinois National and Jet Aviation is, I
respectfully submit, misplaced. There is no mutual mistake
here, only negligence and ignorance—neither of which is a
legitimate basis for an equitable reformation of the contract.
The insurer made changes to its policy, and negligently sold
the altered policy to the insured, who was ignorant of the
changes. Although Jet Aviation facilitated the procurement
of Wyndham’s aircraft insurance coverage with Illinois
National, this fact does not eliminate the general contractual
obligations of the insurer to the insured. As written, the
Endorsement—expressing the aircraft insurance coverage
purchased by Wyndham—extended the indemnification of Jet
Aviation’s policy with Illinois National to insure the nonowned aircraft of the “Named Insured.” The Endorsement
explicitly references Wyndham as a “Named Insured.” The
insurer indemnified the insured on these terms and these
words are binding.
As we have previously stated, New Jersey law insists
that insurance policies are to be interpreted according to their
“plain, ordinary meaning.” Colliers Lanard & Axilbund v.
Lloyds of London, 458 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Nav-Its, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of America, 869 A.2d 929,
933 (2005). The plain meaning of a contract can be
overridden only in rare, exceptional circumstances. Id.
Moreover, while I do not read any patent or latent ambiguity
here, in such instances policies generally “should be
construed to sustain coverage.” President v. Jenkins, 853
A.2d 247, 254 (2004). There is simply no support in state law
for the conclusion that the insurer’s failure to read the plain

1

language of its own policy before issuing it to the insured
justifies supplanting these well-accepted tenets of contract
and insurance law with considerations of equity to reform the
contract. This is particularly so where, as here, the insurer
seeks reformation post-loss. Judge Brown analyzed these
issues thoroughly and reasonably. For these reasons, I
respectfully dissent.
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